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Abstract
The new Labour Government in Britain has made the reduction of child
poverty one of its central objectives. This paper describes the specific
initiatives involved in Labour’s approach and weighs them up in terms
of their potential impact. After setting out the extent of the problem of
child poverty, the causes are discussed and Britain's problem is set in
international perspective. The impact on child poverty of policies
designed to raise incomes directly is analysed using micro-simulation
modelling. A major emphasis of current policy is on the promotion of
paid work, and we explore the potential for poverty reduction of
increasing the employment of parents. We find that at its maximum,
increasing paid work could roughly double the reduction in child
poverty achieved by tax and benefit policies alone - a combined decrease
of 1.85 million children in poverty. However, a more realistic forecast of
increases in parental employment suggests that the number of children
in poverty may be reduced by 1 million by 2002. The policies that
address long-term disadvantage are also discussed and finally the whole
programme is assessed and future strategy is considered.4
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The new Labour Government in Britain has made the reduction of child
poverty one of its central objectives. Before its election in 1997 after 18
years of Conservative Government the growth in relative poverty and
the damage to society of widening inequality were constant themes of
Labour politicians. Before he became Prime Minister Tony Blair said that
unless a new Labour Government succeeded in raising the incomes of
the poorest it would have failed. Yet prior to the election there were few
policy commitments and no specific emphasis on child poverty. This has
now changed. In March 1999 Tony Blair said: “Our historic aim will be
for ours to be the first generation to end child poverty…. It is a 20 year
mission” (Walker, 1999). The Chancellor of the Exchequer has called
child poverty “a scar on the nation’s soul” (Brown, 1999). A plethora of
policy initiatives and series of review documents show the priority that
the government now gives to reforming and modernising the welfare
state in general and to tackling child poverty in particular.1
The purpose of this paper is to describe the initiatives taken up to
the end of January 2000 and to weigh them up in terms of potential
impact  – how much substance lies behind the fine words and noble
aspirations? First, the extent of the problem of child poverty is set out,
the causes are analysed and Britain’s problem is set in international
perspective. In section 3 the new Labour Government’s overall approach
is described. Then in section 4 policies designed to raise incomes directly
are described and their impact is analysed using micro-simulation
modelling. In section 5 policies to increase paid work are described and
their possible impact on poverty is simulated. The policies that address
long-term disadvantage are discussed in section 6. Finally the whole
programme is assessed and future strategy is considered.
                                                
1  Policy initiatives are summarised in Department of Social Security (1999a).
Background analysis is set out in HM Treasury series on The Modernisation of
Britain’s Tax and Benefit System, which is available at www.hmtreasury.gov.uk.5
2 The Extent and Causes of Child Poverty in Britain
The Labour Government “is committed to tackling poverty and its
causes.” In the first of what are to be annual reports on poverty and
social exclusion it stated:
“Poverty affects different aspects of people’s lives, existing
when people are denied opportunities to work, to learn, to
live healthy and fulfilling lives, and to live out their
retirement years in security. Lack of income, access to good-
quality health, education and housing, and the quality of the
local environment all affect people’s well-being. Our view of
poverty covers all these aspects.” (DSS, 1999a: 23)
The definition of poverty has been subject to extensive,
occasionally useful, discussion. During the years of Conservative
Government (1979-1997) there was no official concession that poverty
existed and no definition of it was accepted (although statistics relevant
to poverty continued to be published). Now Labour Ministers talk
openly about poverty. For the most part they concentrate on a narrower
concept of poverty than that quoted above, namely income poverty.
They use statistics often based on a poverty line of one-half of mean
equivalised disposable income, which is used throughout this paper.
Such a relative definition of poverty has continued to be used by most of
the academic community and follows practice in most other countries.
Details of the methodology are discussed further in section 4 and by the
Department of Social Security (1999b).
2.1 Extent
Over the period since 1979 for which consistent data are available, the
number of children in poverty has tripled; this growth makes child
poverty a growing cause for concern.
Overall the latest figures for 1997/8 show that 11 million people
were living below half the mean income level (before housing costs) and
14 million people were living below half the mean level of income on an
“after housing costs” basis. This represents one-quarter of the
population. Of this number, 4.5 million were children; one in three
children were living in poverty.
Much of the public perception of the problem in Britain is that
child poverty is largely a problem involving lone-parent or very young
families, that it is associated with ethnic minorities and that it largely
occurs in public housing. In fact all these stereotypes are misleading.6
Slightly less than half (48%) had parent(s) aged under 30 years; only one-
fifth (19%) were from ethnic minorities and two-fifths (43%) were in
local authority housing.2
Nonetheless, certain groups of children are particularly likely to
live in households which have low incomes. Overall 40% of children live
at a low income level (defined now as in the bottom 30% of the income
distribution). But those most at risk include children in
families with four or more children (73%)
families with mothers aged 16-24 (68%)
ethnic minority families (65%)
lone parent, never married (79%)
lone parent, divorced or separated (66%)
families without a working parent (86%)
(Source: Box 3.1 Department of Social Security, 1999a)
2.2 Causes
The growth in the extent of child poverty in Britain is shown in Table 1.3
It can be seen that about two thirds of the poorest children were in
families without a full-time worker and the biggest absolute increase
was in single parent families, most of whom were not in paid work. But
the most rapid growth occurred in families with one or two children and
a full-time worker. Thus, the analysis of child poverty points to not one
but a number of causes: there are more children in workless households
and there are more children in “working poor” households.
Nearly one in five children in Britain now lives in a household
where no one is in paid work – double the proportion in 1979 and four
times the proportion in 1968 (Gregg et al, 1999). This growth is the result
of three principal changes. First, the number of lone parent families has
risen; most are headed by women and most of these women are not in
paid work. Second, unemployment levels have not fallen to the levels of
the 1970s. Third, male inactivity rates have risen substantially; this has
been most marked for men aged 50 and over but among men aged 25-49
the proportion economically inactive rose from 1.9% in 1979 to 7.6% 1998
(Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999) so that inactivity is now a more prevalent
cause of worklessness than unemployment. Recent work such as that of
                                                
2  Table 4.1 (AHC) Department of Social Security, 1999b; children in self-
employed and pensioner households are excluded.
3  For 1997/8, figures for both before and after housing costs are given since
most of the analysis below uses the “BHC” definition. For comparability over
time, the AHC figure is the most useful.7
Hills, Jenkins and Walker (in Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion,
1999) adopts a dynamic approach and emphasises long-term problems.
Persistent worklessness from this perspective is now a more serious
problem than short-term unemployment.
Table 1: Children in Poverty (thousands)
1979 1997/8 1997/8
AHC AHC BHC
One or more full time workers
- self employed 250 500 450
- employee, 1 or 2 children 70 460 310
- employee, 3 or more children 160 460 350
Others
- single parents 280 1830 1200
- couples with children 680 1140 1000
All 1400 4400 3300
Notes: Poverty = Below 50% of mean equalised income level after housing costs
Sources: 1979 - Department of Social Security (1998); 1997/8 – Department of Social
Security (1999b).
The growth in the number of poor children in working households
is attributable according to the Treasury to two main changes (discussed
in HM Treasury, 1999a). First, the increase in inequality of earnings: the
wages of men in the top decile group grew over the last two decades at
twice the rate of those in the bottom decile group. Second, more working
households relied on part-time work which was often insufficient to lift
the household out of relative poverty.
2.3 International  comparison
Consistent international evidence has recently been compiled for
UNICEF by Bradbury and Jantti (1999). Using the Luxembourg Income
Study data for 25 nations, the extent of child poverty has been compared
using a variety of poverty standards. Here the results, using the
standard most consistent with the British Government’s standard, are
summarised in Table 2.8
Table 2: Child Poverty Rates











Russia 1995 26.6 0.08 0.60 31.0 26.0
United States 1994 26.3 0.15 0.60 59.6 16.7
UK 1995 21.3 0.19 0.70 40.3 17.5
Italy 1995 21.2 0.02 0.73 20.2 20.9
Australia 1994 17.1 0.09 0.73 38.3 14.7
Canada 1994 16.0 0.11 0.69 45.3 12.3
Ireland 1987 14.8 0.03 0.73 29.8 16.7
Israel 1992 14.7 0.03 0.71 26.6 14.0
Poland 1992 14.2 0.05 0.72 4.9 13.7
Spain 1990 13.1 0.02 0.62 25.2 12.4
Germany 1994 11.6 0.09 0.77 43.3 8.5
Hungary 1994 11.5 0.06 0.66 12.0 10.9
France 1989 9.8 0.07 0.75 25.4 7.7
Netherlands 1991 8.4 0.08 0.82 29.6 6.8
Switzerland 1982 6.3 0.07 0.88 21.2 4.8
Taiwan 1995 6.3 0.02 0.57 15.2 5.1
Luxembourg 1994 6.3 0.06 0.76 30.1 4.4
Belgium 1992 6.1 0.07 0.78 11.8 6.1
Denmark 1992 5.9 0.13 0.76 10.5 5.5
Austria 1987 5.6 0.10 0.73 33.2 2.9
Norway 1995 4.5 0.14 0.73 10.4 3.4
Sweden 1992 3.7 0.15 0.82 4.5 3.6
Finland 1991 3.4 0.09 0.79 6.2 3.0
Slovakia 1992 2.2 0.05 0.73 7.6 2.1
Czech Republic 1992 1.8 0.07 0.75 8.9 1.3
Note: Children are poor if their households have an equivalent disposable income
less than 50% of the overall median (before housing costs).
Source: Bradbury and Jantti (1999) Tables 3.3 and 3.49
Britain4 had the third highest proportion of children in poverty
overall and the highest of any European country. The rate was more
than twice that in France or the Netherlands and over five times that in
the Nordic countries. The proportion of children with lone mothers in
Britain was the highest of any country and the poverty rate of such
children among the highest. While most of the countries studied had
child poverty rates that changed little in the last decade or so, only
Britain and Italy of the EU countries had a fast growing poverty rate.
Thus, viewed from an international perspective, there is little
doubt of the severity of Britain’s child poverty problem.
The most striking difference that helps to account for Britain’s
higher child poverty rate is the extent to which children are in workless
households; this is shown in Table 3. Only Ireland has higher rates of
non-employment for working-age households with children.
Table 3: Risk of Non-Employment for Working-Age Household with
Children, 1996
Single Adult Households Two-Adult Households
Switzerland 17.1 1.7
Luxembourg 29.7 2.1
Portugal 25.2  2.5
Greece 35.4  3.1
Australia 23.5  3.3
Germany 38.0  5.5
Netherlands 55.1  5.7
United States 34.1 5.7
France 34.0  5.9






Source: Table 1.7, OECD (1998).
                                                
4 The  term  ‘Britain’ is used for convenience to denote England, Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland.10
3 Government Initiatives Relevant to Child Poverty
The Government summarised its overall approach as follows:
“In the past, attempts to deal with these issues often focused
on short-term, piecemeal solutions. Huge sums were spent
dealing with immediate problems, very little on preventing
problems occurring in the future. Our approach is radically
different. We are putting in place new solutions to old
problems, working together with all sectors of society and
through better working throughout government. We are:
♦   tackling the causes of poverty and social exclusion, not
just the symptoms.
♦   creating a fairer society in which everyone has the
opportunity to achieve their full potential; and
♦   investing in individuals and communities to equip
them to take control of their lives.”
Source: DSS (1999a: 3).
The overall strategy of welfare reform has the aim of ensuring paid
work for those who can, security for those who cannot. The principal
measures to reduce child poverty may be conveniently divided into
three categories:
1.  Policies to alter income levels directly through the tax and benefit
system. The aim is to provide direct financial support to all
families, recognising the extra costs of children, while targeting
extra resources on those who need it most.
2.  Policies to promote paid work. The aim is to ensure that parents
have the help and incentives they need to find work. Paid work is
seen as the best long-term route to financial independence for
families. The Government aims to reduce the number of working-
age people in families claiming Income Support or income-based
Job-Seekers’ Allowance for long periods of time.
3.  Measures to tackle long-term disadvantage.
This division is convenient – and the analysis of policies and their
impact follows this division in the next three sections - but the goals of
these policies overlap. For example, one of the aims of tax and benefit
policies is to support and reward work and make it worthwhile both to
move off benefit and into work. No attempt is made here to discuss in
detail all the policy changes that relate to children. Analysis of all the11
reforms in the education system, for example, could, and in time no
doubt will, fill many volumes. Our focus is on those policies with the
most direct bearing on child poverty.
4 Policies to Alter Income Levels Directly
4.1 Policy changes
In 1997 the main features of the system of taxes and benefits for children
had not been substantially changed in structure for over twenty years. In
the post-war Beveridge reforms universal family allowance for second
and subsequent children had been introduced. These were integrated
with child tax allowances in 1976 when Child Benefits payable for all
children were introduced. A means-tested benefit for low income
working families was introduced in 1971 and extended and re-named
Family Credit as part of the Fowler reforms in the late 1980s. There are
child additions to the main social assistance benefits and to some
contributory benefits. The income tax system which in 1997 was based
largely on individual, not family, assessments, no longer had tax
allowances or other concessions for children.5
By January 2000, the main changes introduced or planned by the
new Labour Government were the following:6
1.  Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in October
1999. This tax credit, normally to be paid through the pay packet,
replaces Family Credit which was a means-tested benefit paid
direct to families. The tax credit, like Family Credit, is withdrawn
according to income. WFTC is more generous with a higher
maximum payment and a lower taper. To qualify a person must
work 16 hours a week or more, have a dependent child and not
have capital of more than £8,000. The credit is larger if a parent
does paid work for 30 hours a week or more.
2.  Child Benefit is being increased by more than the rate of inflation.
This is a universal benefit paid for each eligible child without any
test of means and not subject to income tax. For the first child it
was raised by £2.95 in April 1999 and will go up to £15.00 a week
                                                
5 See  O’Donoghue and Sutherland (1998) for a discussion of tax concessions for
children within Europe.
6  All monetary amounts are in £ sterling. At the time of writing £1 equals
approximately  1.60 or US$1.60.12
in April 2000 – an increase of 36% since 1997. Child Benefit for the
second and subsequent children is being increased to £10.00 in
April 2000.
3.  Children’s Tax Credit will be introduced from April 2001. This tax
credit, which is a replacement for the Married Couple’s Tax
Allowance and the corresponding tax allowance for lone parents,
will be paid to a parent in all families with children aged under 16,
except that it will be withdrawn from higher rate tax payers. It will
be worth up to £416 a year to families with an income tax payer.
4.  Rates of Income Support (IS) and other associated means-tested
benefits are being increased for families with children, particularly
for those with children under 11. This is the means-tested safety
net available to unemployed, sick or disabled families and to lone-
parent families. The premiums for children aged under 11
increased by £4.70 in October 1999 and will rise by a further £1.05
in April 2000, bringing them into line with the premiums for
children aged over 11.
According to government estimates, the extra spending on children by
2001 will amount to:
Working Families Tax Credit £2.0bn
Children’s Tax Credit £1.8 bn
Child Benefit and income-related benefits £1.8 bn
Other £0.35 bn
Total £6.0 bn
Source: Chart 3.4, HM Treasury (1999).
The extra spending of £6 billion amounts to 0.7% of gross domestic
product and 2% of total government expenditure. Not all this extra
spending can genuinely be claimed as representing an advance against
child poverty. Two billion would have had to be spent anyway if
benefits were to be increased just in line with prices.
In addition, the government figures relate to some specific child-
related measures announced in the Budgets of 1998 and 1999. Other
general measures, such as changes to income tax, also affect families
with children. Commitments to additional policy reforms other were
made during the first months of the Labour government. These include
the introduction of a National Minimum Wage of £3.60 per hour for
those aged 21 and over, which is predicted to boost the hourly earnings
of nearly two million workers, two-thirds of them women, by an
average of 30% (DSS, 1999a: 92). Another decision was to abolish special13
benefits for lone parents; this will tend to reduce incomes of some
families with children. It is to the net effects of all these changes that we
now turn.
4.2  The impact of policy changes
In this section we carry out our own quantitative exploration of the
impact of Labour’s policy on child poverty. We make use of POLIMOD,
a static tax-benefit model to simulate the effect of tax and benefit
changes on household incomes. This model uses representative
household survey micro-data to calculate taxes and benefits before and
after policy reforms. See Redmond et al (1998) for more information.7
Similar exercises – with differences in coverage and emphasis – have
been carried out by Immervoll et al (1999), the Institute for Fiscal
Studies8 and by the government itself (HM Treasury, 1999). The present
analysis is distinguished by its attempt to capture the effects of all the
main policy changes and commitments since the Labour government
came to power in 1997 that are appropriate to model in this way. The
policy changes that are simulated include those that will reduce the
incomes of families with children, as well as those designed to increase
them. In addition, we are able to offer more detailed breakdowns of the
effects of the combined changes: to examine losses as well as gains, and
                                                
7  Our analysis is based on Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data for 1994/5
and 1995/6 updated to 1999/00 prices and incomes. To model the immediate
affect on incomes POLIMOD calculates liabilities (or entitlements) to income
tax, National Insurance contributions (NICs), child benefit, Family Credit (FC)
or Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), Income Support (IS) - including
income-related Job Seekers Allowance and pensioners’ Minimum Income
Guarantee, Housing Benefit (HB) and Council Tax Benefit (CTB). Otherwise,
elements of income are drawn from the recorded values in the FES dataset.
We attempt to capture the effects of non- take up of means-tested benefits
(FC/WFTC, IS, HB and CTB) by applying the take-up proportions estimated
by the Department of Social Security (DSS, 1999C). For example we assume
that some 20% of lone parents do not receive the FC (or WFTC) to which they
are entitled, and 15% of people of working age do not receive the IS to which
they are entitled. In general we assume that take-up behaviour is not affected
by changes in the size of benefit entitlements.
We also model the effect of the minimum wage assuming that all with hourly
earnings below the relevant minimum are brought up to it and that working
hours do not change. Resulting changes in earnings then affect tax and
benefits.
8 See  www.ifs.org.uk/budgets.14
to focus separately on children in lone parent and two-parent families.
We also extend our analysis in section 5 by exploring the sensitivity of
the results to changes in the labour force participation of parents.
We start with policy rules as they existed in April 1997 and uprate
their values to April 1999 using the Retail Prices Index. This is the
counter factual – the policy we assume would have prevailed had Labour
not come to power.9
The policy changes that are modelled are listed in detail in the
Appendix. They include all those that have been announced, whether or
not they are operational in 1999/00. New policy is set in terms of
1999/00 prices.10 The changes that we explore include those specifically
targeted on children, discussed in the previous section. We also model
some general changes to income tax (including rate reductions, the
abolition of relief on mortgage interest and allowances for couples and
lone parents) and National Insurance contributions (alignment of
earnings thresholds with income tax thresholds), as well as the
introduction of the minimum wage, adjustments to benefit rates (apart
from price indexation), the restriction of incapacity benefit for people in
receipt of pension income, and the introduction of an annual fuel
allowance for pensioners.11
Our estimate of the revenue cost to the government of the
combination of these changes is £5.54bn per year (in 1999/00 prices).12
                                                
9  Uprating is applied to all monetary values, not just elements of the tax-benefit
system that are subject to statutory uprating or are traditionally uprated every
year. We use the Rossi index (RPI less housing costs) for means-tested
benefits.
10  Although announcements about future policy are often ambiguous about
whether the amounts refer to the current year or the year of implementation.
11  There are two important aspects of policy relating to children that we do not
include in our analysis: the childcare tax credit associated with the Working
Families Tax Credit, and changes to Child Support. In both these cases we
believe that uncertainty about behavioural responses would make model
estimates misleading or unreliable.
12  This takes account of the extra revenue from increased income tax and
employee contributions due to the introduction of the minimum wage. It does
not include the extra cost of paying the minimum wage to government
employees. The overall increase in gross earnings due to the minimum wage
is estimated to be £1.66bn per year, making the total increase in net household
income £7.20bn per year. Overall, our estimate is not comparable with the
government’s estimate of £6bn quoted earlier. Our figures show the15
The effects on the distribution of household incomes are shown in Table
4. To rank people we used household income after tax and benefits
(without deducting housing costs) and equivalised using the
McClements scale.13
Table 4: The Distributional Effects of Labour’s Policy
% of children mean % change in
household income**





before after all persons children increases decreases
bottom 13.4 9.3 5.5 7.9 80 19
2
nd 13.9 11.7 6.1 9.3 93 7
3
rd 11.0 12.5 4.7 7.4 93 7
4
th 10.4 12.2 3.5 4.9 94 6
5
th 10.9 11.5 2.6 3.5 97 3
6
th 10.1 10.9 2.1 2.7 96 3
7
th 9.5 10.2 1.6 1.9 93 7
8
th 7.8 8.2 1.2 1.7 90 10
9
th 6.8 7.2 0.9 1.1 80 20
top 6.1 6.2 0.2 0.3 64 36
All 100.0 100.0 1.8 3.2 89 11
Notes: *Equivalised disposable household income using April 1997 policy in
1999/00 prices. Household income is weighted by number of individuals and
equivalised using the McClements scale.
**These columns show the average change in household income for all people and
for children. The differences between the columns reflect the fact that some
households do not contain children.
Source: POLIMOD
The first column shows the location of children in the household
income distribution. Children are defined as is customary in UK social
policy: aged under 16 or under 19 if in full-time secondary level
                                                                                                                                  
additional cost, over and above indexation, and include the effects of some
additional policy changes.
13  0.61 for the first adult (head), 0.39 for a spouse of the head, 0.46 for any other
second adult, 0.42 for a third adult and 0.36 for subsequent adults. The child
scale is 0.09 (age 0-1), 0.18 (age 2-4), 0.21 (age 5-7), 0.23 (age 8-10), 0.25 (age 11-
12), 0.27 (age 13-15) and 0.36 for any children aged 16 or over.16
education and not married. We see that under pre-Labour policy
children are concentrated in the lower parts of the income distribution.
Nearly 60% of children are in households with the lowest 50% of
incomes.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 show the mean
percentage change in household disposable income in each decile group
for all persons and just for children. Many of the recent policy changes
have been targeted directly at families with children and this is reflected
in a percentage increase in household income which is 75% higher for
children than for people in general. With the exception of the bottom
decile group which includes a disproportionate number of losers, a clear
gradient is evident: lower income households and the children in them
gain more in proportional terms. (The pattern is the same in absolute
terms. For example the bottom decile group gains an average of £5.53
per week, the 2
nd decile £8.99, the 6
th decile £5.94 and the top decile
£1.89.)14 The second column shows that households with children are
moved up the distribution by the reforms.
The great majority of children (89%) are in households who gain
from the reforms. However, some are worse off and although the
majority of these are in better off households, some 2.5% of all British
children are not only worse off following Labour’s policy reforms, they
are also in the poorest 10% of households. As shown in the final column
of Table 4, nearly 1 in 5 children in households in the bottom decile -
340, 000 children – are worse off as a result of the reforms. These
children tend to be in households not in receipt of Income Support (IS)
who lose mortgage interest tax relief, or in households in receipt of IS
with children aged over 11, who lose lone parent benefit and premia.15
In absolute terms their fall in income is small (£2.90 per week on
average) but this represents about 4% of their pre-reform income. This is
                                                
14  As with all such estimates, this pattern will be sensitive to some extent to the
chosen equivalence scale. Furthermore, in common with all other analysis
based on survey data, all the POLIMOD estimates in this paper are subject to
sampling error.
15  In practice, lone parents who received lone parent benefits in 1997 will
continue to have their combined child benefit and lone parent benefit
payment protected in cash terms. We model the long-term effect of the
structural change.17
a feature of the government policy package that is, unsurprisingly, not
highlighted in its own analysis.16
Our particular concern is children living in poverty and the extent
to which Labour’s policy can reduce the prevalence and severity of this
experience. The starting point of our analysis is the statistics on
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) produced by the
government (DSS, 1999b).17 We would like to be able to answer the
question: how many fewer children will be counted as poor in these
statistics once the package of Labour’s policies that we have modelled
has taken effect? The household income variable used for ranking in
Table 4 has been deliberately defined to be very similar to that used in
the HBAI statistics, using the “before housing costs” (BHC) measure.
However, there are some minor differences due to the fact that we must
simulate taxes and benefits in order to evaluate changes in the rules that
govern them.18
Because changes in numbers below poverty lines may be sensitive
to the relationship between the line and benefit level,19 we also use two
                                                
16  We have no evidence which suggests that the children in these households are
more advantaged in some non-monetary way or are particularly likely to
benefit from the non-financial part of the government’s strategy on child
poverty.
17  For a description of these statistics in the context of targets for poverty
reduction in the UK see Atkinson (1998).
18  We have updated FES data to 1999/2000 levels of prices and incomes in order
to evaluate contemporary policy changes. In addition, there are some
measurement differences which arise because we simulate some components
of income (taxes and benefits), rather than using values recorded in the
survey data. There are also a few conceptual differences which we introduce
in order to capture all the changes in policy on which we focus – notably the
change in mortgage tax relief which is not included in HBAI BHC income.
More detail on these sources of difference is available in Mitton and
Sutherland (2000). The main effect of simulating the tax and benefit
components of income appears to be to narrow the income distribution to
some extent. As described in Mitton and Sutherland, we expect the poverty
line derived from simulated incomes to be some 96% of that derived from
recorded survey data. This lower poverty line results in fewer people being
counted as poor.
19  For example, if the IS level of income for a lone parent with one child were
just below the poverty line under 1997 policy and was made slightly more
generous, large numbers of lone parents and their children would appear to
have been removed from poverty. On the other hand, a line drawn lower or a18
alternative poverty cut-offs. These are defined arbitrarily as 10% greater
and 10% less than the “half mean” line and for convenience we refer to
those below the first as being “in or near poverty” (below 55% of mean
income) and those below the second as being in “severe poverty” (below
45% of mean income).20
Using 50% of mean equivalised household income as the poverty
line, Table 5 shows that, under April 1997 policy, there are 19.1% of
persons and 26.3% of children below the line and counted as poor. This
includes the entire bottom decile group and most of the second in Table
4. Introducing Labour’s policy changes as described above reduces the
overall poverty rate to 16% and the child poverty rate to 19.9%. For
simplicity, in our analysis we do not re-calculate the poverty line
following the impact of policy on incomes.21 The latter reduction of 6.4
percentage points corresponds to 840,000 children. This estimate is
broadly in line with the Treasury claim that child poverty would be
reduced by 800,000 (for a somewhat different set of policy changes);22 of
these 60% were in families with a full-time worker, 15% with a part-time
worker, 12% with a self-employed worker and 13% in workless families
(HM Treasury, 1999A, Box 3.1).
Using the higher “in or near poverty” line naturally increases the
numbers counted as poor, both before and after the policy changes.
However, the absolute reduction in poverty is smaller, particularly for
children, if a higher cut-off is used. The reduction in child poverty is
now 5.5 percentage points, corresponding to 730, 000 children. Drawing
a lower poverty line (“severe poverty”) provides us with a similar
estimate of the numbers of children who are moved out of poverty as in
the  “i n  o r  n e a r  p o v e r t y ” case (child poverty falls by 5.8 percentage
points).
                                                                                                                                  
little higher would make a increase in IS seem ineffective in reducing poverty
rates.
20  Mean equivalised income is £315.73 per week in October 1999 prices. For a
lone parent with one child aged 6 the “half mean” (BHC) poverty line is
£129.45 per week. The “in or near poverty” line is £142.39 and the “severe
poverty” line is £116.50 per week.
21  However it is interesting to note that equivalised mean income rises by £5.82
per week or 1.8%. The net reduction in children counted as poor, allowing the
poverty line to move, would be 670,000 with 700,000 moving out and 30,000
moving in.
22  Note that estimates of this type may be particularly sensitive to sampling
error. See Pudney and Sutherland (1994).19
Clearly the “standard” line is drawn at a point that is particularly
sensitive to policy changes. The choice of poverty cut-off is important in
evaluating the success of policy in reducing child poverty. Caution
should be attached to the use of a single measure of poverty reduction.
Whatever poverty line used, the impact of new policies is a clear and
substantial reduction in child poverty. At the same time, we see that
although large numbers of children are moved out of poverty, some
10,000 children in lone parent families find that their incomes are
reduced such that they move into poverty. In addition it is clear from
Table 4 that many who are in the bottom decile and already in poverty
are pushed deeper into it.
The impact of Labour’s tax and benefit changes is shown
graphically in Chart A which compares incomes before and after the
changes in relation to each poverty line.
Table 5 shows the effects on children in one- and two- parent
families separately. Although children in one-parent families are over-
represented among the poor and make up 35% of poor children (and
only 22% of all children), the policy changes reduce the proportions of
children in poverty in the two groups by roughly the same proportions:
about a quarter using the standard poverty line.
The impact of policy changes on the number of poor children is
important but so too is the poverty gap, defined as the total shortfall of
household equivalised income for each child below the standard poverty
line. The size of the poverty gap for children is reduced by slightly less
than the headcount of poor children; we find that the combined policy
changes bring about a 22.5% reduction in poverty gap. Although there is
some interaction between the policy measures, it is possible to
decompose approximately the reduction in poverty gap that is
attributable to the main groups of changes. We focus on three that are
shown below:
Child benefit, lone parent benefit and Income Support and other means
tested benefit changes reduce the poverty gap by  17.4%
The WFTC reduces the poverty gap by   4.7%
The minimum wage reduces the poverty gap by  1.6%20
Table 5: Poverty rates before and after Labour’s policy
Children All persons
All One parent Two parents
Poverty line: 50% mean
% poor, April 1997 policy 19.1 26.3 42.5 21.8
% poor, Labour policy 16.0 19.9 32.0 16.6
% point difference 3.1 6.4 10.5 5.2
Net number removed from poverty 1,770,000 840,000 300,000 540,000
Moved out 1,830,000 850,000 310,000 540,000
Moved in 60,000 10,000 10,000 0
“Near” poverty line: 55% mean
% poor, April 1997 policy 24.7 32.6 55.8 26.2
% poor, Labour policy 21.7 27.1 47.8 21.3
% point difference 3.0 5.5 8.0 4.9
Net number removed from poverty 1,750,000 730,000 230,000 500,000
Moved out 1,830,000 740,000 240,000 500,000
Moved in 80,000 10,000 10,000 0
“Severe” poverty line: 45% mean
% poor, April 1997 policy 13.5 18.4 25.7 16.4
% poor, Labour policy 10.8 12.6 18.2 11.1
% point difference 2.7 5.8 7.5 5.3
Net number removed from poverty 1,550,000 760,000 210,000 550,000
Moved out 1,590,000 770,000 220,000 550,000
Moved in 40,000 10,000 10,000 0
Source: POLIMOD.
It is clear that the increases in child benefit and social assistance
benefits  – even allowing for the reductions in lone parent benefits -
contribute the largest share (three quarters) to the immediate reduction
in poverty gap.
The main effects of tax and benefit changes and introduction of the
minimum wage are summarised as follows:
  They increase the incomes of the poorest more than those of the
better-off and of households with children more than others.21
  Nine out of ten children are in households with increased income
but one in ten are worse off. One fifth of the poorest children are in
households where incomes fall.
  The proportion of children in poverty (below 50% of mean income)
falls from 26% to 20%, a decrease of 840,000 – 540,000 in two-
parent and 300,000 in one-parent families.
  The changes reduce the size of the poverty gap – the aggregate
deficit below the poverty line – by nearly one quarter. This
reduction is mainly due to the effects of increases in child benefit
and means-tested benefit rates for children.
4.3  The changes in the tax and benefit systems: some reflections
Ending child poverty requires an adequate minimum income. For those
in Britain who depend on social security the minimum income, or safety
net, is the Income Support system. The levels of Income Support are
shown in Table 6 in comparison with the poverty level of half-mean
equivalised income after housing costs. It will be seen that for those who
do not have employment, the minimum income is far below the poverty
level. The reduction of poverty, and the achievement of security for
those who cannot work, depends on reducing those deficits.











one child aged 6
87.35 113.76 76.8%
Notes: Poverty level for 1999-2000 is poverty level for 1997-98 (Department of Social
Security, 1999b) adjusted for forecast rise in Real Household Disposable Income and
Retail Price Index set out in HM Treasury (1999b).
The government has, as described above, reduced the deficit for
young children, but by abolishing the premium for one-parent families it
worsened the deficit for some families. For the future, there is no
commitment to up-rate Income Support levels by more than the rise in
prices. Nor has there been any indication of an intention to increase22
Income Support levels to make up the deficit below the poverty level. To
do this would require further redistribution, which has yet to be
discussed, at least in public, by the government. Failure in the future to
increase Income Support in line with the rise in other incomes will
inevitably contribute to relative poverty being higher than it otherwise
would have been.
Most of the redistribution that the policy changes will bring about
is being achieved – some would argue being concealed – by the use of
new-style tax credits. These have a number of clear differences from
more conventional benefits. First, it puts resources in pay packets rather
in benefits paid separately, usually through Post Offices. Whether this
will make it clear that “work pays”, as has been argued by the
Chancellor, remains to be seen. Reliance on employers to pay out tax
credits is no problem for those with stable, reliable employers; for those
with tardy or transitory employers there may be real administrative
problems.
A second difference between benefits and tax credits is that the
former have been treated in government accounts as expenditure and
the latter as negative taxation. In the past, this has often resulted in tax
credits and allowances rising in value when public expenditure has been
tightly constrained; this is not merely an artificial distinction, it is one
that has tended to favour those better-off who gain from tax concessions
at the expense of those relying on benefits. If tax credits and social
security benefits are treated equivalently then so much the better.
A third important difference is that tax credits are the
responsibility of the Inland Revenue which is controlled by the
Treasury. At every opportunity the Chancellor has shown concern for
child poverty and has seemed keen to integrate taxation and social
security. For the Treasury to show such interest is unusual and clearly
makes poverty reduction more likely. On the other hand, the Treasury
has little of the Department of Social Security’s experience of delivering
services, in many cases to people budgeting from day to day, let alone
from week to week; the Inland Revenue’s annual assessment of income
is little help to a child facing poverty today. Politically the Treasury has
not in the past shown conspicuous concern for the poor while the
Department of Social Security has defended the interests of those
dependent on benefits; whether one Chancellor can achieve a long-term
conversion is another open question.23
5 Policies to Promote Paid Work
The Government’s approach has been described in clear terms:
“Our strategy is to tackle the causes of poverty and social
exclusion by helping people find work.
A proactive welfare system is at the heart of tackling
worklessness. Our ambition is to deliver a change of culture
among benefit claimants, employers and public servants,
with rights and responsibilities on all sides. Those making
the shift from welfare into work are being provided with
positive assistance, not just a benefit payment. We are
shifting the focus to include all groups – p a r t n e r s  o f  t h e
unemployed, lone parents, carers, people with a long-term
illness or disability – not just the claimant unemployed.
There are two key components of this.” (DSS,1999a: 84)
The strategy rests on two key components: making work pay and
helping people return to or find paid work.
One of the aims of the Working Families Tax Credit (and the
associated Childcare Tax Credit) is to “make work pay”. One example of
this is the following.
“Before the reforms a couple with two young children where
the father moved into work at a typical male entry wage of
£200 a week was only £30 better off per week than on benefit.
This has now increased to £42.” (HM Treasury, 1999a: 33)
To help people to return to or find work, new benefit clients of
working age, including lone parents, will be required to take part in
work-focused interviews at the single gateway into the system
(designated ‘ONE’) which will provide a personal adviser. For example:
“The New Deal for Lone Parents is a comprehensive package
of back-to-work help designed to:
♦   help and encourage lone parents on Income Support to
take up paid work; and
♦   improve the job-readiness of lone parents on Income
Support and increase their employment
opportunities.”
(Source: DSS, 1999a: 59)24
In addition to policies designed to get people into paid work there
are other labour market policies to improve the position of those in
work.
  The promotion of lifelong learning and work based learning.
  Measures to tackle discrimination against people with disabilities,
women and ethnic minorities.
  The promotion of family-friendly employment policies and
improved maternity and parental rights.
All these labour market policies will, to some extent, contribute to
reducing child poverty.
5.2  Making work pay
How far have the policy changes served to make paid work more
financially attractive? Tables 7 and 8 show some illustrative calculations
of the gain from earning for two family types (lone parents with one
child and couples with two children), using standard government
assumptions about housing costs and other circumstances that affect
benefit entitlement. The increases in the gain from earning due to
Labour’s policies are at best modest. In the case of lone parents, those
earning around £100 per week would find that the return to working
was lower under Labour policy than under policy that existed before the
1997 election. This is due to the combination of the abolition of lone
parent benefit and the interaction between WFTC and Housing Benefit
and Council Tax Benefit. To some extent, this may be due to particular
assumptions about rent and other circumstances in these stylised
calculations. To explore whether it is a more general phenomenon, we
compare the gains for lone parents from entering employment at
different earnings levels (using a representative sample of lone parents
from the Family Expenditure Survey). This shows that with minimum
employment (16 hours on the minimum wage) the majority of lone
parents (66%) gain less from entering work than they would under pre-
Labour policy. At a higher level of earnings (30 hours on the minimum
wage) most (58%) gain more as a result of Labour policies. The averages
may mask a range of actual situations and circumstances. Chart B plots
the gain from earning the minimum wage for 30 hours under the two
policy regimes.23 Points above the 45
o line show cases where lone parent
families gain more from working under Labour policy than under
                                                
23  For each lone parent in the FES database who is not currently employed and
who have no children aged under 5.25
previous policy. The reverse is the case for points below the line.24 It
seems clear that even with higher earnings many lone parents in a range
of circumstances have a reduced incentive to work under Labour than
previously.
Table 7: Gains from earning – Lone Parent with one child
(aged under 11)
Pre-Labour policy Post-Labour policy
Earnings Net income Gain from
earning
Net income Gain from
earning
0 138 144
50 148 10 154 10
100 184 46 182 38
150 199 61 212 68
200 203 65 227 83
250 218 80 242 98
300 252 114 258 114
350 285 147 291 147
400 319 181 325 181
Notes: All figures per week, rounded.
Source: POLIMOD using assumptions about rent and council tax taken from
Department of Social Security (1999d), Table 1.2a.
                                                
24  Note that the policies that are modelled include cuts to income tax and NICs
and increases in child benefit: those on incomes (including unearned income
and transfers from other households) that are high enough not to qualify for
WFTC will tend to all be above the line.26
Table 8: Gains from earning – Couple with two children
(aged under 11)
Pre-Labour policy Post-Labour policy
Earnings Net income Gain from
earning
Net income Gain from
earning
0 187 207
50 197 10 217 10
100 204 17 225 18
150 217 30 243 36
200 218 31 258 51
250 224 37 273 66
300 255 68 289 82
350 289 102 304 97
400 322 135 335 128
Notes: All figures per week, rounded.
Source: POLIMOD using the same assumptions, updated, as Chart 1 and Table 2 in
HM Treasury The Working Families Tax Credit and Work Incentives, 1998.
5.3  The potential impact of possible changes in working patterns
The policy changes that we have just described are designed to push or
pull people not doing paid work into the labour market. Whether or not
these policies will have the desired effect and how large it will be
depends on many factors that we do not attempt to forecast. Rather we
simulate possible changes to analyse their impact on child poverty. In
this section we explore the implications for poverty measures of various
scenarios of changed work patterns. We make use of the same
POLIMOD model and the same assumptions as before.
We assume that changes in paid work will not occur when:
  the youngest child is aged under 525
  the parent(s) are over pension age,
                                                
25  This is the maximum age for starting school in the UK. Although some lone
parents with pre-school children may wish to do paid work and make use of
childcare of some form, we do not think it is appropriate to assume that all
such parents should be considered to be “available for work”. In fact, in our
database, 13% of lone parents with children aged under 5 are employed for 16
hours or more, compared with 35% of lone parents whose children are all
aged 5 or older.27
  the parent(s) are currently employed or full time students
  the parent(s) are receiving benefits that indicate they would
not/could not accept paid work (disability benefits, maternity
benefit etc).
We focus first on the children of lone parents and then on a wider group
also including children living with both parents. In our simulations we
choose to put all people in our target groups into work. This is to
illustrate the maximum potential impact. There are 350,000 such lone
parents and 1,070,000 couples.26 For lone parents we examine three work
entry scenarios in turn:
(i)  All assumed to work for 16 hours at the minimum wage (£57.60
per week)
(ii)  All assumed to work for 30 hours at the minimum wage (£108.00
per week)
(iii)  Earnings are taken to be the mean of actual values in the updated
FES dataset for lone parents currently in work: £128.83 for those
employed less than 30 hours, £317.87 for those employed for 30
hours or more. As in the database, 50% of lone parents work under
30 hours and 50% over.
For couples we explore the scenario:
(iv)  All assumed to work for 30 hours at the minimum wage.27
Table 9 shows the impact on child poverty for one parent families of
each of the work entry scenarios, both with and without Labour’s
tax/benefit changes. Table 10 shows the same information for working
at the minimum wage for 30 hours, for children in two-parent families
and for the two family types combined. The figures show the poverty
reduction following the tax/benefit changes alone (as in Table 5) and the
additional reduction in poverty following work entry under Labour
tax/benefit policy. This is contrasted with poverty reduction following
                                                
26  We assume no increase or decrease in hours or earnings for those already in
paid work. We ignore childcare costs. We assume that people entering work
all claim and receive WFTC, if entitled, but otherwise we assume that benefit
take-up behaviour remains constant.
27  In the case of couples we assume just one of them enters work. For the
purposes of these calculations it does not matter whether it is the mother or
the father.28
work entry under pre-Labour policies.28  For example, for lone parent
children using the 50% mean poverty line, 300,000 children are removed
from poverty by tax/benefit changes alone. If parents with children over
5 (and meeting the other conditions) entered work for 16 hours at the
minimum wage another 300,000 children would be clear of poverty. If
taxes and benefits had not changed but the same change in paid work
had occurred, poverty would have fallen by 260,000.
It is clear that the additional effect of getting parents into work has
a significant effect on child poverty rates. Putting all able-bodied parents
without very young children into work has an additional effect that
roughly matches that of the tax/benefit policy changes alone.
For lone parents, the combination of tax/benefit changes and paid
work reduces child poverty rates by about half in total, with up to
710,000 children being moved above the 50% mean poverty line (Table
9). We see that the level of earnings makes little difference at the two
higher levels, but that lower poverty reduction is achieved by minimum
employment of 16 hours.
Table 9: Net reduction in child poverty due to changes in employment
patterns: lone parent families (thousands of children)
Lone parents enter employment Labour
tax/benefit
changes only
Pre-Labour policies Post-Labour policies**
Work entry scenario*: - (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Poverty line:
50% mean
300 300 410 410 260 370 390
“Near” poverty line:
55% mean
230 260 420 450 260 470 470
“Severe” poverty line:
45% mean
210 260 320 320 180 230 220
Notes: *See text for explanation.
**These reductions are in addition to those due to Labour tax/benefit policies alone.
Source: POLIMOD
                                                
28  Where we assume, nevertheless, that entry wages are no lower than the
minimum wage.29
Interestingly, entry into employment is generally more effective at
reducing child poverty in lone parent families under pre-Labour policy
than after the tax/benefit reforms. (The reverse is the case when the
highest of the three poverty lines is used.) We have already seen that for
some lone parents the returns to working are smaller under Labour than
previously. The lesser effect on poverty is also because, as we have seen,
a significant number of lone parents lose from Labour’s combined
tax/benefit changes.
In contrast, putting two parent families into work (Table 10) has a
larger effect on poverty among children in this group under Labour
tax/benefit policies than under pre-Labour policies. It seems that the
increased generosity of the WFTC has the effect of bringing more newly
employed two-parent families above the poverty line. With 30 hours
work at the minimum wage the number of children in these families
raised above the poverty line rises from 540,000 by 620,000 to 1,160,000.
Per person employed, however, the reduction in number of poor
children is lower for two-parent families than one-parent families.
Employment of an eligible lone parent on average reduces child poverty
by 1.8 times as much as employment of an eligible parent in a couple
under Labour tax/benefit policies.29
It should be noted that the scenario, which combines entry into
employment for both lone parents and couples, involves a major
expansion of employment by nearly 1.5 million jobs; this contributes by
taking about 1 million children out of poverty. Even then, overall child
poverty is reduced by 1,850,000: roughly halved, not reduced to zero.
The explanation mainly lies in the fact that not all children have a parent
that is available to enter work for 16 hours or more. The children of
parents who we assume to be potentially available for work make up
just 49% of poor children (using the standard line).30 Those that remain
are the sick and disabled, parents of very young children and people
already working for low earnings. These families may be helped by tax
and benefit policy, but not – at least in the short term – by employment
strategies.
Table 11 focuses on the children in families where we have
assumed that a parent enters work. It shows poverty rates among these
children (a) before any changes, (b) after Labour tax/benefit policies, (c)
                                                
29  Under pre-Labour tax/benefit policies the ratio is 3.4: 1 (one parent: two
parent).
30  The figures are 45% and 56% for the “hear” and “severe” lines respectively.30
on entry into work under pre-Labour tax/benefit policies and (d) on
entry into work under Labour policies. The table shows that in general
the combination of tax/benefit policy changes and employment is pretty
effective at removing these children from poverty. For the children of
lone parents, poverty rates fall to single figures except where the
poverty line is high or the assumed earnings are the minimum to qualify
for WFTC. It is also possible to discern a small additional effect of the
tax-benefit changes on top of the employment effects. For example, for
the higher two poverty lines and the most generous/optimistic earnings
assumption – (iii) – the poverty reduction is greater under the WFTC
(from 71% to 3% using the standard line) than under unreformed
tax/benefit policies (71% to 7%). This shows that in some conditions the
WFTC could bring a few more lone parents out of poverty on entry into
work than did the less generous family credit. But the effect is small and
most of the impact of the WFTC will be on children whose parents are
already in paid work (as included in the calculations shown in first
column of Table 9) or through encouraging lone parents to take up
work.
For children in two parent families the combination of Labour
tax/benefit policies and entry into employment is less effective at
reducing poverty rates than it is for the children of lone parents. Poverty
rates are substantially reduced (for example from 60% to 19% using the
standard poverty line) but less so than under the corresponding scenario
for lone parents (where the reduction is from 71% to 4%). Much more of
the “action” seems to come from the tax/benefit policy changes than
from employment. Not only is the poverty reduction following
tax/benefit changes alone larger for children in two- than one-parent
families (a reduction of 11 percentage points, compared with 8), but the
difference in the effectiveness of employment under the two policy
regimes is quite marked. Child poverty rates for this group fall from
60% to 42% following entry into employment under pre-Labour policy;
however they fall to 19% if they enter work under Labour tax/benefit
policies. Thus is appears that the combination of tax/benefit policies
favours children in two-parent families (compared with children living
with one parent) and have a significant impact on poverty rates in this
group; none of these children lose from the reforms.31
Table 10: Net reduction in child poverty due to changes in employment patterns: two parent families and all
families (thousands of children)



















Work entry scenario*: - (iv) - (v) =(ii)+(iv)
Poverty line:
50% mean
540 370 620 840 790 1010
“Near” poverty line:
55% mean
500 250 510 730 670 970
“Severe” poverty line:
45% mean
550 500 600 760 810 810
Notes: *See text for explanation.
**These reductions are in addition to those due to Labour tax/benefit policies alone.
Columns of Tables 9 and 10 may not sum due to rounding.
Source: POLIMOD.32








Work entry scenario*: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) = (ii) + (iv)
% of all children 4.9 4.9 4.9 15.9 20.8
% of children in one/two parent families 22.7 22.7 22.7 20.2 20.8
Poverty line: 50% mean                           (a) poor before** % 71 71 71 60 62
(b) poor after Labour tax/benefit changes % 63 63 63 49 52
(c) poor after employment under pre-Labour policy % 25 7 7 42 34
(d) poor after employment under post-Labour policy % 23 4 3 19 16
“Near” Poverty line: 55% mean             (a) poor before** % 86 86 86 66 71
(b) poor after Labour tax/benefit changes % 83 83 83 61 66
(c) poor after employment under pre-Labour policy % 46 20 16 54 46
(d) poor after employment under post-Labour policy % 45 10 11 37 31
“Severe”Poverty line 45% mean             (a) poor before** % 51 51 51 49 49
(b) poor after Labour tax/benefit changes % 34 34 34 34 34
(c) poor after employment under pre-Labour policy % 9 3 2 25 20
(d) poor after employment under post-Labour policy % 8 1 2 5 4
Note: *See text for explanation; ** Labour tax/benefit changes.
Source: POLIMOD33
In Summary:
  The simulations of work-entry scenarios suggest that for lone
parents and for couples, entry into paid work for all those who are
able-bodied and with children aged 5 or over could roughly
double the reduction in poverty achieved by the tax/benefit
changes alone.
  With a major expansion of paid work for parents, by around 1.5
million jobs, poverty would be reduced by 1,850,000 or roughly
halved, leaving about 2 million children still in poverty.
5.4  Increasing paid work: some reflections
The government’s objective is to increase paid work as one way of
reducing child poverty. It is aiming to do this by means of sticks and
carrots. ONE and the New Deal are in part both sticks and carrots but
the only group for whom there is direct sanction are those registered as
unemployed; lone parent families are encouraged to discuss and seek
training and employment but, as yet at least, benefits are not conditional
on compliance. The main carrot is the Working Families Tax Credit
which is aimed at make low-paid work more attractive and, alongside
the minimum wage, guarantee a minimum income to those in paid
work. The WFTC is intended to ease the unemployment trap (a lack of
any significant gain in net income as a result of taking a job) and ease the
poverty trap (the loss of most additional earnings – or high marginal
effective tax rate – due to income tax, national insurance contributions,
and reduced means-tested benefits). However, this inevitably involves
extending the poverty trap, increasing the earnings band over which
marginal effective tax rates are high (but not as high as before). As this
extension up the earnings distribution occurs, the numbers involved
increase rapidly. Thus the WFTC will reduce the number facing
marginal effective tax rates of 80% or more, but it will increase the
number facing marginal losses of over 65%.
It remains the case that many will gain relatively little from paid
work, as shown in section 5.2. Thus, it seems unlikely that the “carrot” of
financial gain will encourage many more into paid work.
It is certainly the case that unemployment has been falling but how
far this is due to the New Deal is uncertain. Some argue that the fall in
unemployment is the result of economic growth, others see that new
supply-side policies as making a real contribution. It remains a matter of
controversy how far jobs are available in the poorest areas (see New
Economy, 1999.).34
Another constraint on paid employment for parents of young
children is the availability of childcare. The new National Childcare
Strategy is starting to increase the amount of available childcare but, as
yet, provision remains patchy and limited so that its impact on
employment will for the next few years be limited.
A major issue in relation to paid work concerns lone parents. The
issue may be put in over-simplified terms. Should they be required to
work to get benefits, as happens in the USA? Should they have childcare
available that allows them to support themselves through paid work, as
happens in Scandinavian countries? British policy has not confronted
this issue but rather seeks to allow choice and encourage paid work.
How far this compromise will be effective or sustainable remains to be
seen.
6 Long-Term Disadvantage
The issue of intergenerational child poverty is discussed by Hobcraft,
and by Machin (in CASE and HM Treasury, 1999). The Department of
Social Security summarised the findings as follows:
♦   “Poverty in childhood increases the likelihood of low
income in adulthood;
♦   there is a strong association between children’s
earnings and those of their parents. Only a third of
boys whose fathers were in the bottom quarter of the
earnings distribution made it to the top half when they
grew up and the pattern is similar for girls. Men whose
fathers were unemployed are twice as likely to be
unemployed for a year or more between the ages of 23
and 33; and
♦   people’s chances of being in a manual occupation,
having no access to a car and living in rented
accommodation are also higher if their parents were in
the same position.
There are key risk factors occurring during childhood and
adolescence which research suggests increase the likelihood
that disadvantaged children will fare worse in later life.35
-  Poor early development
-  Poor school attendance
-  Being ‘looked after’ by a local authority
-  Contact with the police
-  Drug misuse
-  Teenage parenthood
-  Non-participation in education, employment and
training between the ages of 16-18.
Many of these factors are linked - for example, young
women in care have repeatedly been shown to be at higher
risk of teenage pregnancy and teenage parents are more
likely to drop out of education early.”
(Source: Cm 4445: 43-4)
This assessment of ‘risk factors’ is important in indicating the
breadth of the government’s thinking about the causes of poverty, what
some have characterised as “joined-up” thinking. As will be seen in the
next section, policy initiatives address many aspects of these risk factors,
not merely those that have an immediate impact on poverty defined
narrowly in terms of inadequate income. However, as will be discussed
in the final section, the ability of government to influence some risk
factors – such as growth of lone parent families – may be rather limited.
The expansion of thinking about the causes of child poverty is,
nevertheless, liberating and challenging.
In relation to children and young people the aim was to break the
cycle of disadvantage, with three policy priorities:
♦   “Ensuring that all children get a high-quality education
wherever they go to school and providing additional
help to children in the crucial pre-school years.
♦   Combating family poverty and social exclusion
through our policies to tackle worklessness, increasing
financial support for families and improving the
environment in which children grow up.
♦   Supporting vulnerable young people, especially in the
difficult transition from childhood to adult life.”
(Source: Cm4445: 5)
6.1  Measures to tackle long-term disadvantage
One of the objectives of many reforms in education, healthcare,
employment and environmental policy is to provide a better start for36
vulnerable families. Two major initiatives are focussed on children in the
pre-school period.
“The central challenge is to ensure that every child arrives at
school healthy and ready to learn. This means we need to
increase opportunities and to provide effective, integrated
support that addresses both the needs of children and their
parents.
The period before and immediately after birth is
crucial to a child’s development and future prospects. We
are addressing this through help to the poorest families.
The Sure Start strategy: In April 1999 the first 21 Sure
Start programmes were announced. They will offer help to
families with children from birth up to the age of four, in
areas where children are most at risk from poverty and
social exclusion.
Through the National Childcare Strategy we aim to
ensure good quality, affordable childcare for children aged
0-14 in every neighbourhood. £470 million will be invested in
childcare in England over the lifetime of this Parliament,
including £170 million from the New Opportunities Fund to
support new out-of-school services.” (Source: Cm 4445: 46)
A number of initiatives are being taken to make sure that all
children benefit from increased opportunities. Here three examples must
serve.
First, there is concern at the extent of exclusions from school and
the extent of truancy. This was investigated by the Social Exclusion Unit,
set up within the Cabinet Office in 1997 (SEU, 1998). £500 million is
being invested to reduce exclusion and truancy in schools and to raise
the attainment levels of children at risk of social exclusion. A range of
innovative projects are being introduced to tackle disaffection and invest
in specific action aimed at those pupils excluded for more than 15 days.
Second, there is additional investment being made to improve
opportunities for ethnic minority pupils. Children from ethnic minority
backgrounds now represent one in ten of the school population, and
over half a million of these do not have English as a first language and
others at risk of failure, including support for the community mentoring
programmes for children. To enable schools to respond to these
additional needs, they will receive grants to employ additional specialist
teachers or bilingual classroom assistant.37
Third, measures are being taken to half the rate of teenage
conception (SEU, 1999). The UK has the highest teenage birth rate in
Western Europe. The problem is most serious in the poorest areas and
among the most vulnerable young people, especially those in care and
those excluded from school.
These and other measures to tackle long-term disadvantage lie at
the heart of the government’s attempt to tackle the causes of future child
poverty. How far they will be successful is beyond the scope of this
paper – indeed in many cases beyond the range of any social science
knowledge. Rather more can be known about the immediate effects of
government policies on child poverty, and it is to this that the next
section turns.
7 Assessment and Conclusions
7.1  The prospect for child poverty
In section 4 results of micro-simulation of the policy changes indicate
that on current and already announced policies31 the number of children
in poverty will by 2002 fall by about 840,000 – a reduction of about one-
quarter. If paid work increases greatly, by 1.5 million jobs (scenarios ii
and iv in section 5) then child poverty would fall by a further million or
by a total of 1,850,000. This is an illustration of the near upper bound of
what could happen, not a forecast. The actual prospects for parents’ paid
work are uncertain but if their employment increased by 250,000 by 2002
this would contribute to child poverty reduction by about 160,000.
Together with tax and benefit changes would result in a fall in child
poverty of about one million – or by one-third of its current level. This
seems a realistic forecast, but three aspects warrant attention.
First, not surprisingly, those raised out of poverty tend to be those
closest to the poverty line. In 1979 two-thirds of those below half the
average income level were in the range 40-50% of the average. In 1998
two-thirds of those below half-mean income level were below 40% of the
average (DSS, 1998; DSS 1999b). Thus, as the depth as well as the
number in child poverty has worsened, so has the problem of tackling it
become more severe. While a start has been made, it has largely dealt
with the least severe cases.
                                                
31  At the time of writing, at the end of January 2000.38
Second, it is important to stress that, while child poverty will be
substantially reduced, the extent of child poverty that will remain in
2002 is extremely high by post-war Britain standards and by European
standards. Child poverty will still be over twice as high as when a
Labour Government was last in office. If the Prime Minister’s declared
aim of abolishing child poverty in a generation is to be achieved then it
will not be enough to roll forward the policy initiatives taken so far, it
will be necessary to maintain, indeed accelerate, the momentum of
policy change and achieve further transfers of resources to families with
children.
Third, this forecast depends on unemployment being kept down.
As was stated in The Changing Welfare State:
“Sharp economic downturns and structural change lead to
high unemployment and economic inactivity. This in turn
can increase benefit caseloads dramatically. Such changes are
not automatically reversed as the economy improves. If no
action is taken, high levels of worklessness can persist for
long periods. And persistent worklessness leads to poverty
and social exclusion.” (DSS, 2000: 67)
7.2  A selective strategy
The paper has considered the policy initiatives so far presented by the
British Government - some of which, like the Child Tax Credit, have yet
to be implemented. As might be expected, given the Labour Party’s
reluctance to present specific policy proposals before its election, the
Government has not come forward with any long-term plan for
achieving the Prime Minister’s aim for overcoming child poverty in a
generation.
The evidence and analysis presented here suggests that the policy
initiatives taken so far will have a significant, positive impact on child
poverty. But they will only reduce child poverty by about one-quarter
and only the easiest part of the problem will be resolved. To maintain
momentum will require more poor families to earn more - which will
require skills, childcare and jobs - and to receive more from the state
either in subsidies to low pay or social benefits - which will require more
redistribution. Whether the political will exists or can be generated to
maintain this momentum, only the future will tell.
There is however one fundamental aspect of the ‘New Labour’
approach which deserves discussion since it will certainly influence
long-term developments. The present Chancellor, Gordon Brown, has,39
far more than previous Chancellors, taken charge of policy concerning
poverty (including issues such as Third World Debt, which are far
beyond the scope of this paper) and shows genuine interest and
commitment. The approach has been to concentrate resources on the
poor by means of greater selectivity and means testing. While child
benefit has not been ignored, the increase in it is far smaller than in the
means-tested element now operated through the Working Families Tax
Credit. In the short- or medium-term greater targeting or selectivity is
the most effective means of boosting the incomes of the poorest. But, in
the longer-term, increased support for the poorest which is then rapidly
withdrawn from those with more earnings, serves to extend the poverty
trap  – even if its extremes are smoothed out. There is a danger of
creating a two-class world among families: poor families with no or low
pay who receive large amounts of Income Support or Working Families
Tax Credit and other families who receive little state support. If the
condition of the poor families is improved but not that of other families
on low or average incomes, then the incentive to self-help will inevitably
decline. Thus, while the New Labour approach emphasises
responsibilities and stresses the desirability of more self-reliance, its
selectivity strategy may be undermining what it seeks to encourage.
7.3 Joined-up government
Much government rhetoric has been devoted to the tackling the causes
of poverty and “investing in success”; by contrast, traditional social
security is “investing in failure” and redistribution has become
politically unmentionable. Prevention is preferable to alleviation of
poverty. Yet most of the impact of the policy initiatives in the short and
medium term depends on redistribution. Most of the immediate
reduction in child poverty results from the increases in Child Benefit
and Income Support for younger children and the Working Families Tax
Credit. These changes, plus others such as the Child Tax Credit are all
essentially redistribution to families with children. For some, this
redistribution may serve to make work pay rather better than before, but
any effect of this on employment is likely to be limited. Other labour
market policies are likely to have a relatively small impact. Policies
directed at long-term disadvantage will only have an impact in the long-
term.
It remains far from clear that government thinking is “joined-up”.
To take one example, to qualify for Working Families Tax Credit
requires 16 hours work; by contrast, for 3 and 4 year olds at school, only
12.5 hours of nursery schooling are provided for 33 weeks of the year.40
Some small steps towards child- and parent-friendly government have
been made but there is still a very long way to go.
“Joined-up” policy not only requires coherence between
government departments. The opportunities of children depend on
social provisions but they also depend on their family environment on
the local community, and on the wider economic and social
environment. Ending income poverty is not on its own enough to ensure
decent opportunities for all children. If, as the Secretary of State for
Social Security wrote, “Children born in run-down estates should have
the same opportunities as those born in leafy suburbs, the same good
health, the same decent education and the same hope for the future”,
(Darling, 1999) then a more fundamental rethink about public and
private responsibilities for children and about inequality in society
cannot be long delayed.
An indication of coherent thinking is the commitment to review
policies and publish an annual report on progress. An independent
review of indicators of poverty and deprivation is already being
undertaken and published (Howarth et al, 1999). Yet for government
with superior access to data and resources to monitor the effectiveness
of its own policies, and to publish the results, is a courageous
commitment which suggests that their concern about child poverty is
not ephemeral headline-grabbing.
7.4 Conclusions
Britain has had a growing problem of child poverty, which is now
among the most severe among industrialised nations. This problem is
closely linked to high levels of worklessness in families with children.
The Labour Government has adopted redistributive tax/benefit
policies and active labour market policies that should by 2002 reduce the
number of children in poverty by about one million. But there are some
losers even at very low income levels.
Even if the promotion of paid work were successful to most
improbable extent, this would still leave 2 million or more children in
poverty. Such an increase in paid work is improbable since measures to
‘make work pay’ have made little difference.
To make work pay to a greater extent there are unpalatable but
inescapable choices. Either Income Support levels to those not working
would have to be relatively reduced (which will happen over time if
uprating is not in line with other incomes) – which will add to child
poverty. Or benefits to those in low paid work (such as WFTC) will have
to increase. If this is done only for those on very low earnings, the41
means-testing involved will exacerbate the poverty trap discouraging
self-reliance; if higher benefits are spread to higher earnings levels, the
cost to the Exchequer will be greatly increased and can only be met by
explicitly redistributive tax policies.
The promotion of paid work is not, however, only a matter of
financial incentives: it involves too child care, transport and family-
friendly employment. The difficulties and stress – impinging on both
parents and children – that result from combining paid work and the
care and upbringing of children will only be marginally affected by
Labour’s reforms thus far.
The challenge of overcoming child poverty is a challenge to the
whole society. What happens to the poorest, most vulnerable, least
secure children reflects the society as a whole. How far child poverty can
be ended and children’s opportunities improved without confronting
the broader inequalities in society is open to question. Nevertheless, by
focussing on the income and opportunities of the poorest, a significant
start has been made towards ending child poverty. Much remains to be
done but the Prime Minister has said and the Chancellor has repeated:
“We will not rest until we have banished child poverty from the face of
Britain” (Brown, 1999, p.8). On the basis of the analysis presented here,
rest may be a long time in coming.424344
Appendix: Modelled changes in tax and benefit policy
announced since April 1997
Amounts are weekly and differences expressed in real terms, unless otherwise
specified. At the time of writing £1 equals approximately E1.60 or US$1.60.
Introduction of a Minimum wage of £3.60 per hour for employees aged 22 and over;
£3.00 for employees aged 18-21.
Child benefit increased by £3.25 to £15 for first or only children and £0.40 to £10 for
other children.
Lone parent benefit abolished (the 1997 benefit would have been £6.45 in 1999/00 in
real terms).
Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) replaces family credit. WFTC has a more
generous starting point (by £9.35); a lower taper (55% instead of 70%); a higher adult
credit (by £2.50), higher credits for children aged under 11 (by £8.30 per child) but
lower credits for children aged 18 (£10.35 lower). (The childcare tax credit is not
modelled.)
Income Support: family premium increased by £2.80; lone parent premium
abolished (it would have been worth £5.15 in 1999/00); rates for children aged under
11 increased by £8.30 and those for other children aged under 18 by £0.40; rates for
children aged 18 reduced by £9.35; premia for pensioners (“Minimum Income
Guarantee”) increased by £4.65 (single) and £7.45 (couples) and disability premia
increased by £0.90 per person.
Housing benefit (HB) and Council tax benefit (CTB) changes match those for
income support except that the real value of the 1997 lone parent premia (abolished)
is £23.05 (HB) and £11.75 (CTB); there is no reduction in allowance for children aged
18 in HB and CTB.
Capital thresholds in all means-tested benefits (including WFTC) reduced in real
value by 4.8% since 1997. (These have not been uprated since 1988.)
Winter fuel allowance: £100 per year for households containing a person over state
pension age or in receipt of Income Support pensioner premium. (Assumed to be
£1.92 per week.)
National insurance contributions: Class 1 employee contribution lower earnings
limit (LEL) increased by £17 (to £83); upper earnings limit (UEL) increased by £50 (to
£550); contributions on earnings below the LEL (“entry fee”) abolished (worth up to
£1.32 per week). Class 2 (self-employed) contributions reduced by £4.55. Class 4
(self-employed) lower profits limit aligned with the Class 1 LEL (a reduction of £61);45
Class 4 upper profits limit aligned with the Class 1 UEL (an increase of £50) and the
rate of Class 4 increased from 6% to 7%.
Income tax schedule: introduction of a 10% lower rate on first £1500 of annual
taxable income (replaces 20% lower band); standard rate reduced from 23% to 22%.
Married couples allowance (MCA) for couples both aged under 65 and Additional
personal allowance abolished. (Under 1997 policy this was worth 15% of £1970 per
year or £5.68 per week in 1999/00 prices.) Age-related MCA increased so that
pensioner couples do not lose. Age-related personal allowances increased by £130
per year (age 65-74) or £200 per year (age 75+).
Mortgage tax relief abolished. (In 1997 the maximum annual relief was 15% of the
annual interest on £30,000.)
Introduction of a Children’s tax credit: this is worth £8 to (taxpayer) families with
children aged under 16. If either parent is a higher-rate (40%) taxpayer, the value of
the annual credit is tapered at a rate of £1 for every £15 of income per year above the
40% threshold.
Incapacity benefit is reduced by 50p for every £1 of occupational or personal
pension income over £85 per week.46
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